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The question of whether apartheid is a crime against humanity might
seem an odd one for many people living outside South Africa-and in-
deed for the vast majority of people living inside South Africa. With the
recent demise of legalized apartheid in South Africa, one might ask if
apartheid's status under international law has any contemporary rele-
vance beyond a small group of legal academics. The status of apartheid
under international law-in particular whether apartheid constitutes a
crime against humanity-is a question that the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") was obligated to address in its final
report.
But the importance of this question goes well beyond the immediate
mandate of that Commission. While apartheid as a legal institution no
longer exists, its legacy will continue to be felt within South Africa. In
addition, racism continues to be an all too pervasive phenomenon in
most, if not all, societies worldwide. It is for this reason that a group of
international jurists and human rights organizations submitted to the TRC
this statement of international law that argues why apartheid meets the
definition of a crime against humanity. These signatories hope that this
submission will contribute to the emerging moral and legal consensus
that racism in any form will not be tolerated, and that institutionalized
racism gives rise to international criminal liability that does not diminish
with the passage of time.'
The apartheid system of legalized racial discrimination systemati-
cally used violence to impoverish, malnourish, and in other ways violate
the fundamental rights of the overwhelming majority of South Africans
because of their race. That system must surely qualify as "persecution
based on race" and thus as a crime against humanity.! Numerous
authoritative international bodies concur in this judgment: the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly in scores of resolutions has consistently asserted that
apartheid is a crime against humanity, and the U.N. Security Council has
made similar assertions, at times unanimously By January 1, 1996,
1. See, e.g., Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limits to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 68 (1969) [hereinafter
Statutory Limitations Convention], discussed infra at note 65.
2. "Persecution based on race" is a part of every definition of crimes against humanity
that has been considered since the first definition articulated in the Nuremberg Charter. See
infra notes 31-49 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
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ninety-nine states had ratified the Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,4 (the "Apartheid Convention",)
which declared apartheid a crime against humanity and obligated mem-
ber states to prosecute those guilty of the crime of apartheid-six more
ratifications than the convention prohibiting torture,5 and only three less
than the convention outlawing slavery.6
Within South Africa's new, non-racial7 democracy, however, par-
ticularly in the context of the TRC, the assertion that apartheid is a crime
against humanity produced a reaction among a small but vocal minority
who argued that apartheid, however evil, does not qualify as a crime
against humanity! South African lawyers and politicians had pursued
this line of argument during the apartheid era in response to the numer-
ous U.N. resolutions and, more particularly, in response to the Apartheid
Convention.9
In the immediate post-apartheid era the debate over the international
status of apartheid was further complicated by assertions that apartheid
was in fact genocide-a particular kind of crime against humanity-and
that the apartheid government was quite similar to the Nazi government
in its ideology, policies, and effects. While the TRC in fact may have
uncovered evidence that apartheid exhibited the requisite intent to qualify
as genocide,' ° the comparison to Nazi Germany shifted the debate in
parts of South African society from whether apartheid meets the legal
definition of a crime against humanity to a debate about the similarities
and differences between the South African National Party government
and the Nazi Party government, and between apartheid and the Nazi per-
4. Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights: Classifica-
tion and Status of Ratifications as of 1 January 1996, 17 HUM. RTS. L.J. 61, 73 (1996).
5. As of January 1, 1996, the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment had ninety-three ratifications. See id. at 69.
6. As of January 1, 1996, the Slavery Convention had 102 ratifications, and the Supple-
mentary Convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade, and institutions and practices
similar to slavery had 114 ratifications. See id. at 68.
7. I use the term "non-racial" here in deference to colleagues in South Africa, who note
that the use of the term "multi-racial" in South Africa echoes the rhetoric of the apartheid gov-
emnment, which claimed that its ideology was multi-racial-i.e. that apartheid recognized many
different races, and was designed to create separate living spaces for each racial group. This is
obviously not the intent of the current government.
8. Hermann Giliomee, Asmal Offers 'No Fresh View, No Ground-Breaking Synthesis' of
Truth, CAPE TIMES, Oct. 23, 196, at 2.
9. See, e.g., H. Booysen, Convention on the Crime of Apartheid, 2 S. AFR. Y.B. INT'L L.
56, 82-90 (1976).
10. See infra note 116; 2 Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report,
510-23 (1998) (reporting on the TRC's special investigation into biological and chemical war-
fare). To provide genocide, one must show that certain acts were committed with "the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such." See infra
note 106.
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secution and holocaust. The question of whether apartheid is a crime
against humanity was thus conflated with a debate over a comparison be-
tween two distinct historical realities-a debate that may be important from a
historical and political point of view, but that is largely irrelevant to the fore-
going legal question.
This submission made to the TRC by the Allard K. Lowenstein Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Clinic, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and twenty-one international law professors regarding apartheid as a crime
against humanity (reproduced below) grew out of the debate within South
Africa concerning apartheid, crimes against humanity, genocide, and Nazism.
This submission is an authoritative statement by experts in international law
concerning the legal status of apartheid and was drafted in part to clarify the
relevant issues for a legal evaluation of apartheid-not only within the TRC,
but also in broader South African and international society. The submission
argues that apartheid does qualify as a crime against humanity under interna-
tional law, even though it may not qualify as genocide, and even though there
may be important differences between the policies of apartheid and Nazism.
While this submission is in part concerned with the status of apartheid
under international law, it is also concerned with the legal definition of
crimes against humanity. Although at first glance the assertion that apartheid
is a crime against humanity seems straightforward, a careful review of
international law concerning apartheid and crimes against humanity reveals
how undeveloped the law is in this area. Moreover, the international response
to apartheid was driven as much by Cold War political concerns as by
principled legal norms."1 These factors combined to make apartheid's legal
status under international law more contentious than one might assume.
Nevertheless, this submission unequivocally concludes that apartheid is a crime
against humanity.'2
Crimes against humanity committed in the last two decades in Cambo-
dia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda remind us of the continued capacity
of human beings to plan and implement the worst atrocities imaginable. This
submission, as a small contribution to the work of the TRC, reiterates the
moral and legal consensus of the international community that such atrocities
are crimes committed not only against their immediate victims, but also
against humanity. We hope that the reiteration and recognition of this truth
will embolden (and in some cases shame) governments, organizations, and
peoples to commit themselves to ensuring that such crimes are not repeated,
11. For a recent discussion of the political dynamics of international reaction to apartheid,
see, for example, KADER ET AL., RECONCILIATION THROUGH TRUTH: A RECKONING OF
APARTHEID'S CRIMINAL GOVERNANCE (1996).
12. The TRC also adopted this position in its final report. See 5 TRUTH AND RECONCILIA-
TION COMMISSION, ch. 6, at $ 101 (last modified Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.polity.org.za/
govdocs/commissions/1998/trc/index.htm>.
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and that those who do commit such crimes are held to some international
account.
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF CONCLUDING
THAT APARTHEID IS A CRIME
AGAINST HUMANITY UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
We, the undersigned international jurists, make this submission to
the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC") to as-
sist you in determining whether apartheid is a crime against humanity.
We do not profess to be experts on apartheid and its effects, or for that
matter on South Africa. Our expertise lies in the area of international law.
In this submission, we set forth and discuss the definition of crimes
against humanity under international law. It is our hope that this defini-
tion, when combined with the wealth of factual material being compiled
by the TRC, will allow it to make a clear and convincing determination
of whether apartheid is a crime against humanity.
While we make this submission as experts in international law, we
also make this submission as supporters of the new South Africa-as
people who have watched with wonder your country's political transition
to a non-racial democracy that respects and ensures the human rights of
all its peoples. We fully support the efforts of the TRC to expose the
painful truth of apartheid as means to furthering reconciliation. It is in
support of your efforts to expose the truth and promote reconciliation
that we make this submission.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The legislative mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
("TRC" or "Commission") authorizes it to investigate crimes that rise to
the level of crimes against humanity under international law. The Pro-
motion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act empowers the TRC to
inquire into: "gross violations of human rights, including violations
which were part of a systematic pattern of abuse,' 3 "the nature, causes
and extent of gross violations of human rights,' 14 "the question whether
such violations were the result of deliberate planning,"'" and
"accountability, political or otherwise, for any such violation."'6
As discussed below, certain acts or series of acts constitute crimes
against humanity, if they are undertaken on a widespread or systematic
basis-in other words, if they are massive in scale or result from deliber-
ate and systematic planning. By empowering the TRC to inquire into the
systematic patterns of abuse that occurred in South Africa, whether those
abuses were the result of deliberate planning, and what degree of ac-
countability attaches to these and other human rights violations, the
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act clearly authorizes
the TRC to investigate crimes that rise to the level of crimes against hu-
manity. We conclude that there is no legal impediment to the TRC
confirming international consensus that apartheid is a crime against hu-
manity.
Through its collection and analysis of detailed information concern-
ing gross violations of human rights, the TRC will have before it a body
of evidence far more comprehensive than has been available to any other
body that has ever considered the international legal status of apartheid.
13. Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, ch. 2, § 4(a)(i) (1995)
(emphasis added) (visited Feb. 17, 1999) <http://www.truth.org.za/legal/act9534.htm>.
14. Id. § 4(a)(ii).
15. Id. § 4(a)(iv).
16. Id. § 4(a)(v).
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Consequently, the TRC is ideally situated to demonstrate that the policy
and implementation of apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity
under international law.
There are two steps in demonstrating that the policy of apartheid is a
crime against humanity. The first step consists of defining the legal ele-
ments of a crime against humanity. The second step involves explaining
how the policy of apartheid, or specific acts and policies that imple-
mented apartheid, fall within that definition. The first inquiry, discussed
in Part II below, concerns the legal definition of "crimes against human-
ity" in international law and constitutes the major part of this submission.
We only briefly discuss the second step, as the Commission has uncov-
ered more material relevant to this part of the inquiry than is available to
us. In Part III we discuss the international opinion developed in the last
three decades that apartheid qualifies as a crime against humanity. Fi-
nally, in Part IV we discuss the legal definition of genocide, a particular
kind of crime against humanity, and emphasize that even if apartheid
does not meet the definition of genocide, it may still constitute a crime
against humanity.
II. THE LEGAL DEFINITION OF A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
A. Definitions
1. Charter of the International Military Tribunal
The definition of crimes against humanity was first codified in an
agreement for prosecuting major criminals "whose offenses had no par-
ticular geographical location."'' 7 This so-called London Agreement has as
an annex the Charter of the International Military Tribunal ("IMT"),
which defined those crimes over which it would have jurisdiction in the
trials at Nuremberg. Those crimes included crimes against peace, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity. The IMT Charter defines crimes
against humanity as:
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other in-
humane acts committed against any civilian population, before
or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within
17. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, 58 Stat. 1544, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 280 (1945).
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the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
1 8
As discussed below, developments in international law have clarified
what constitutes an "inhumane act" and what constitutes "persecution."
2. Control Council Law No. 10
Shortly after the passage of the IMT Charter, Control Council Law
No. 10 was promulgated to empower the Allied powers to prosecute in
their respective zones of occupation "war criminals and other similar of-
fenders, other than those dealt with by the International Military
Tribunal." 9 Control Council Law No. 10 defined crimes against human-
ity as:
atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, ex-
termination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture,
rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious
grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the
country where perpetrated.20
This definition differed from the IMT Charter in two important re-
spects. First, it specifically mentioned "imprisonment, torture, [and]
rape" as additional inhumane acts that qualify as crimes against human-
ity. This was not considered to be an expansion of the definition, but
rather a further elaboration of the phrase "other inhumane acts." Second,
the Control Council Law's definition of "crimes against humanity"
eliminated the IMT Charter's requirement that the crimes be committed
before or during the war, or in execution of or in connection with crimes
against peace or war crimes.21 This change seems to sever the nexus to
armed conflict required by the IMT Charter. While international jurists at
the time disagreed over whether Control Council Law No. 10 made such
a substantive change in the definition of crimes against humanity, there is
consensus today that the requirement of a connection or nexus to armed
conflict has been eliminated. Consequently, as we discuss below, the le-
gal definition of crimes against humanity no longer requires a nexus to
armed conflict.
18. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 6(c), 59 Stat. 1546,
1547, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 284 [hereinafter LMT Charter].
19. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in I TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 xvi (1946-49).
20. Id. art. H(l)(c).
21. See id.
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3. International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
In an effort to prosecute persons responsible for serious' violations of
international humanitarian law, the U.N. Security Council, acting under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, established the International Tribunal
for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). This was the first chance for a functioning tribunal
to adjudicate crimes against humanity since Nuremberg, and the defini-
tion provided in the ICTY statute is almost identical to Control Council
Law No. 10. The ICTY Statute defines crimes against humanity as:
the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character, and directed against any ci-
vilian population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.2
This definition limits crimes against humanity to those committed in
armed conflict. Here the drafters of the ICTY Statute introduced some
confusion because the commentary to this article, in the Report of the
Secretary-General explained that "Crimes against humanity are aimed at
any civilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are
22. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolu-
tion 808 (1993), art. 5, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. Note that
persecution is a crime against humanity, if it is committed on "political, racial and religious
grounds" (emphasis added), whereas previous definitions required that an act be committed
either on political, racial, or religious grounds. See id. The ICTY notes that the use of "and" in
the ICTY Statute is a deviation from customary international law, and therefore the drafters
must not have meant to require that all three grounds be present for persecution to constitute a
crime against humanity. Instead, each of these three grounds sufficiently constitutes a crime
against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a "Dule": Opinion and Judgment, U.N.
Doc. IT-94-1-T, 713, 36 I.L.M. 908, 960 (1997).
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committed in an armed conflict, international or internal in character." 23
As we will discuss later, the decisions of the ICTY clarified that armed
conflict is not a necessary element of crimes against humanity.24
4. International Tribunal for Rwanda
A year after the formation of the ICTY, the United Nations estab-
lished the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda ("ICTR"). The
ICTR Statute defines crimes against humanity as:
the following crimes when committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against any civilian population on national, po-
litical, ethnic, racial or religious grounds:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.2"
This definition differs from earlier definitions in two important ways.
First, the definition replaces the requirement of a nexus to armed conflict
with a requirement that crimes be committed in a widespread or system-
26
atic manner in order to constitute a crime against humanity.
Second, the definition requires that in order for any of the crimes
listed to rise to the level of a crime against humanity, it must be moti-
vated by "national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds."27 Prior
definitions did not require this qualification for all acts encompassing
crimes against humanity; only persecution had to be motivated by these
23. ICTY Statute, supra note 22, at 47.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 62-66.
25. Security Council Resolution 955, art. 3, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994); Statute of
the International Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Stat-
ute].
26. See ICTR Statute, supra note 25, at 1603.
27. See id.
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grounds in order to constitute a specific crime against humanity. This
provision in the ICTR statute also adds the "ethnic" ground which had
not been included in prior definitions, reflecting the development of in-
ternational criminal law since the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Like the ICTY statute, the perse-
cution provision contains the conjunction "and" instead of "or," but this
will presumably be interpreted according to the reading given by the
ICTY.
5. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind
In its 1996 Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, the International Law Commission ("ILC")28 defines crimes
against humanity as:
any of the following acts, when committed in a systematic man-
ner or on a large scale and instigated or directed by a
Government or by any organization or group:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) torture;
(d) enslavement;
(e) persecutions on political, racial, religious or ethnic
grounds;
(f) institutionalized discrimination on racial, ethnic or re-
ligious grounds involving the violation of fundamental
human rights and freedoms and resulting in seriously
disadvantaging a part of the population;
(g) arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population;
(h) arbitrary imprisonment;
(i) forced disappearance of persons;
(j) rape, enforced prostitution and other forms of sexual
abuse;
28. Since 1947, the ILC has been empowered by the General Assembly to prepare a draft
code of offenses against the peace and security of mankind, including a definition of crimes
against humanity. See UNITED NATIONS, THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMIS-
SION (5th ed. 1996).
[Vol. 20:267
Apartheid as a Crime Against Humanity
(k) other inhumane acts which severely damage physical
or mental integrity, health or human dignity, such as
mutilation and severe bodily harm.2 9
The modem ILC definition reflects the evolution of the concept of
crimes against humanity since the Second World War. The category of
"institutionalized discrimination on racial.., grounds" was explicitly
included in the definition to reflect the opinion of the ILC that apartheid
by definition is a crime against humanity." If the TRC adopts the ELC
definition, the question of whether apartheid constitutes "institutionalized
discrimination on racial.., grounds" is not controversial. Acceptance of
the ILC definition is not necessary to a finding that apartheid constitutes
a crime against humanity. All definitions of crimes against humanity in-
clude the categories of "persecution on racial grounds" and "other
inhumane acts." As we argue below, apartheid is a crime against human-
ity if policies and acts undertaken in its name constitute persecution or
other inhumane acts. We agree with the widespread sentiment that apart-
heid constitutes a crime against humanity under any of the definitions
discussed above.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss in more detail those key
legal elements that must be proved before any act or series of acts quali-
fies as a crime against humanity. First, we discuss the two key categories
under which apartheid may constitute a crime against humanity: perse-
cution on racial grounds, and other inhumane acts. Second, we discuss
the requirements for an act to constitute a crime against humanity: the
prohibited acts must be committed on a widespread or systematic basis,
and there must be individual intent and responsibility. The presence of an
armed conflict, however, is not required.
B. Categories of Crimes against Humanity that Apply to Apartheid
There are two categories of crimes against humanity under which
apartheid might fall. They are specifically found in all definitions of
crimes against humanity: (1) persecution on political, racial or religious
grounds, and (2) other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population.
29. Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the In-
ternational Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 93, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter Draft Code].
30. By expressly mentioning institutionalized discrimination, the ILC was reacting in part
to the perceived controversy surrounding the Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid (the "Apartheid Convention") and its definition of crimes against
humanity. As discussed below, this controversy arose not because states thought apartheid
could not qualify as a crime against humanity, but because of other fundamental issues raised
by the Apartheid Convention. See infra notes 83-93 and accompanying text.
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1. Persecution on Political, Racial, or Religious Grounds
The category of persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds
is found in all definitions of crimes against humanity. Since apartheid
was a state-wide system of racial discrimination, it is reasonable to con-
clude that apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity under this
category.
The definition of a crime of persecution has only recently been de-
fined clearly. The ICTY classifies crimes against humanity recognized by
the Nuremburg Charter into two categories: the murder type (murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation), and the persecution type
(persecution on political, racial, or religious grounds).3 The first category
is well defined, based on its prevalence in domestic legal systems. 2 The
second is not so clearly defined or prevalent.33
Case law from the Nuremberg tribunals and the decisions of the cur-
rent ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda provide authoritative examples of acts or omissions that qualify
as persecution. The ICTY looked to definitions of persecution offered by
experts in international law34 and concluded that persecution is an act or
omission committed against someone on account of his or her race, re-
ligion, politics or ethnicity.35 Furthermore, this persecution requires
discrimination that is intended to infringe on an individual's fundamental
rights.36
3 1. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 694.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Professor Bassiouni defines the crime of persecution as:
State Action or Policy leading to the infliction upon an individual of harassment,
torment, oppression, or discriminatory measures, designed to or likely to produce
physical or mental suffering or economic harm, because of the victim's beliefs,
views or membership in a given identifiable group (religious, social, ethnic, linguis-
tic etc.), or simply because the perpetrator sought to single out a given category of
victims for reasons peculiar to the perpetrator.
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
317 (1992). Another definition considered by the ICTY was offered by M. Le Gunehec of the
Cour de Cassation in the Barbie case:
[A]bove all these crimes offend the fundamental rights of mankind; the right to
equality, without distinctions of race, colour, or nationality, and the right to hold
one's own political and religious opinions. Such crimes not only inflict wounds or
death, but are aggravated by the voluntary, deliberate and gratuitous violation of the
dignity of all men and women: these are victimised only because they belong to a
group other than that of their persecutors, or do not accept their dominion.
A. CASSESE, VIOLENCE AND LAW IN THE MODERN AGE 112 (1988).
35. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 698.
36. See id. at 697.
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The convictions of Nazi defendants for crimes against humanity pro-
vide examples of the types of activities that qualify as persecution. The
Nuremberg Tribunal listed the following acts as constituting persecution
and noted their progressive severity: deprivation of the rights to citizen-
ship, to teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry
freely; arrest and confinement, beatings, mutilation, and torture; confis-
cation of property; deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and
extermination."
Individuals were convicted of a crime against humanity for advocat-
ing and inciting violence against Jews.3 for authorizing the use of firing
squads to punish the relatives of suspected saboteurs;39 for signing a de-
cree that provided for the secret deportation, detention, and summary
sentencing of those accused of resisting German occupation;4 0 for con-
tributing to the process for singling out Jews for persecution by imposing
collective fines on the Jewish community; 4 ' for signing decrees extending
anti-Semitic legislation to the newly occupied territories; 42 for drafting
and administering various decrees excluding Jews from the social and
economic sectors of German society; 3 for serving as a judge and thus as
"an instrument in the program of the leaders of the Nazi State of perse-
cution and extermination";" and for signing a series of decrees requiring
37. See United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 14 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 471 (1946-49), supra note 19, at 471. See also TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO
THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL No. 10, at 64-65 (1949), where crimes against humanity:
were the crimes which the average man would think of as most characteristic of the
Nazis, and which we may describe as degradation or extermination of national, po-
litical, racial, religious, or other groups. These crimes cover the vast and terrible
world of the Nuemberg laws, yellow arm bands, 'Aryanization,' concentration
camps, medical experiments, extermination squads, and so on ... [T]he concept of
'crimes against humanity' comprises atrocities which are part of a campaign of dis-
crimination or persecution, and which are crimes against international law even
when committed by nationals of one country against their fellow nationals ....
(emphasis added).
38. The defendant Julius Streicher ardently advocated the boycott of Jewish businesses
and the racially exclusionary Nuremburg Decrees. The Tribunal ruled that "Streicher's incite-
ment to murder and extermination... clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial
grounds .... 22 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILI-
TARY TRIBUNAL 549 (1948) [hereinafter IMT Trials].
39. See id. at 535 (conviction of Keitel).
40. See id. at 535-36.
41. See id. at 527 (conviction of Goering).
42. See id.
43. See id. at 545-46 (conviction of Frick).
44. United States v. Altstoetter ("The Justice Case"), 3 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBU-
NALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 1155-56 (1951) (conviction of Oswald Rothaug).
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registration, ghettoization, affixation of the Star of David, and the de-
portation of Jews from occupied territory.45
The Nuremberg tribunal also indicated that certain acts of economic
discrimination or deprivation, "such [as] offences against personal prop-
erty as would amount to an assault upon the health and life of a human
being (such as the burning of his house or depriving him of his food sup-
ply or his paid employment)" might constitute a crime against
humanity. 6 Even theft, if committed within the proper context, can con-
stitute a crime against humanity.4'
Acts of persecution committed against political opponents of a re-
gime also qualify as crimes against humanity when the persecution is on
account of their political opinion or affiliation. The French Court of Cas-
sation recently confirmed that persecution against political opponents
falls within the definition of crimes against humanity
4
1
Thus, as the ICTY has noted, the crime of persecution can include a
wide variety of acts.49 In the case of apartheid, persecution of an individ-
ual on account of his or her race would qualify as a crime against
humanity under the ICTY definition. Furthermore, persecution of an in-
dividual on the basis of his or her political opposition to apartheid,
regardless of their race, would also constitute a crime against humanity.
45. See 22 IMT Trials, supra note 38, at 576 (conviction of Seyss-Inquart).
46. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-T, 707, 36 I.L.M. 908,
959 (quoting Trial of Fredrich Flick and Five Others ("Flick Case"), Vol. IX, Law Reports of
Trials of War Criminals 51 (U.N. War Crimes Commission London, 1949)).
47. In the Ministries Case, the tribunal held that theft could constitute a crime against hu-
manity:
The defendant contends that stealing the personal property of Jews and other con-
centration camp inmates is not a crime against humanity. But under the
circumstances which we have here related, this plea must be and is rejected. What
was done was done pursuant to a governmental policy, and the thefts were part of a
program of extermination and were one of its objectives.... Without doubt all such
acts are crimes against humanity and he who participates or plays a consenting part
therein is guilty of a crime against humanity.
United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), 14 NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UN-
DER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, at 611.
48. See Federation Nationale des Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and Others
v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 124, 128 (1988) (Cass. Crim.) (defining crimes against humanity as
"inhumane acts and persecution committed in a systematic manner in the name of a State prac-
ticing a policy of ideological supremacy, not only against persons by reason of their
membership of a racial or religious community, but also against the opponents of that policy,
whatever the form of their opposition").
49. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 704, 710, 711.
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2. Other Inhumane Acts
Like the category of "persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds," the category of "other inhumane acts" is found in all defini-
tions of crimes against humanity. While there is some disagreement on
how extensive the category of other inhumane acts is, there is consensus
that at least the following are included: medical experimentation, serious
and direct injury to body or health, mutilations, torture, rape, prolonged
or arbitrary imprisonment, food deprivation, sterilizations, violation of
cadavers, and other egregious physical assaults.0
We follow other commentators in adopting the statutory rule of con-
struction known as ejusdem generis-a rule of construction that strictly
interprets an expansive phrase as referring to acts similar to those specifi-
cally listed. Thus, in order for an act be considered "inhumane" for
purposes of the definition of crimes against humanity, it must be compa-
rable in its cruelty, severity, and unjustness to those acts specifically
mentioned in the definition itself (e.g., murder, deportation, enslave-
ment). In comparison to other definitions, the ILC definition provides
more examples of acts that qualify as inhumane, and includes acts that
severely damage physical or mental integrity, health, or human dignity.5'
C. Elements Common to All Acts That Qualify
as a Crime against Humanity
For persecution or inhumane acts to qualify as a crime against hu-
manity, they must be part of a widespread or systematic pattern.
Furthermore, for an individual to be held responsible for a crime against
humanity, he must have acted with the requisite intent and he must be
aware of the context within which his acts are committed. Finally, while
many crimes against humanity are committed in the context of an armed
conflict, acts with no connection to an armed conflict may also qualify as
a crime against humanity.
50. See United States v. Brandt (The Medical Case), 1-2 NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBU-
NALS, TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 (1946) (medical experimentation); The Queen v. Finta [1994]
1 S.C.R. 701, 817 (inhumanity as treatment that is unnecessarily harsh in the circumstances);
Vespasien V. Pella, Memorandum presente par le Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/39 (1950),
reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 278, 346 (medical experimentation and serious
injury to body or health); Jean Graven, Les Crimes Contre L'Humanite, 76 Recueil des Cours
427, 548-58 (1950-51) (crimes depriving innate rights of the person).
51. See Draft Code, supra note 29. The language here is similar to the TRC's definition of
gross violations of human rights, in particular the category of severe ill treatment.
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1. Widespread or Systematic
Individual crimes only constitute crimes against humanity when they
are part of a widespread or systematic phenomenon." This requirement
elevates what would otherwise be common crimes to international
crimes.5 3 An isolated inhumane act committed by a perpetrator acting on
his own initiative and directed against a single individual is not an inter-
national crime against humanity unless it is part of such a widespread or
systematic phenomenon. Thus, an isolated act that is somehow connected
to other similar acts may rise to the level of a crime against humanity. As
recently stated by the ICTY:
Crimes against humanity are to be distinguished from war crimes
against individuals. In particular, they must be widespread or
demonstrate a systematic character. However, as long as there is
a link with the widespread or systematic attack against a civilian
population, a single act could qualify as a crime against human-
ity. As such, an individual committing a crime against a single
victim or a limited number of victims might be recognized as
52. The U.N. War Crimes Commission established after the Second World War stated that
"As a rule systematic mass action ... was necessary to transform a common crime... into a
crime against humanity." UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR
179 (1948). This position was echoed in the decisions of the Nuremberg Military Tribunals. See
United States v. Altstoetter ("The Justice Case"), supra note 44, at 973 ("systematically organ-
ized and conducted by or with the approval of government"); United States v. Ohlendorf (The
Einsatzgruppen Case), 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRI-
BUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10 498 (1946) ("Crimes against humanity are
acts committed in the course of wholesale and systematic violation of life and liberty.").
53. The commentary to the Draft Code notes that "[tihe thrust of this requirement is to ex-
clude a random act which was not committed as part of a broader plan or policy." Draft Code,
supra note 29, at 94-95. While it is generally true that only an organized state has the level of
organization and resources required to instigate the prohibited acts on a mass or systematic
scale, crimes against humanity can also be instigated by a non-state entity. See Draft Code,
supra note 29, at 95 ("necessary instigation or direction may come from a Government or from
an organization or group") (emphasis added). The massive and systematic crimes instigated by
the emerging Republika Srspka in the former Yugoslavia illustrate this assertion. See Prosecu-
tor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-T, 654, 36 I.L.M. 908, 945 ("[T]he law
in relation to crimes against humanity has developed to take into account forces which, al-
though not those of the legitimate government, have de facto control over, or are able to move
freely within, defined territory."). See also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 241-42 (2d Cir.
1995) (recognizing that individuals acting on behalf of non-state entities can be held account-
able for genocide, a particular crime against humanity). But see BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at
248-49 (1992) (" 'Crimes against humanity' are collective crimes which cannot be committed
unless they are part of a given state's policy because their commission requires the use of the
state's institutions, personnel and resources in order to commit, or refrain from preventing the
commission of [crimes against humanity].").
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guilty of a crime against humanity if his acts were part of the
specific context identified above.54
2. Individual Responsibility and Intent
An individual act constitutes a crime against humanity when (1) the
perpetrator of the act exhibits the general intent to commit the underlying
act (e.g., killing, torture, assault), and (2) the perpetrator is aware of the
broad context in which his or her act occurs.5 Regarding the first ele-
ment, it is not necessary for the perpetrator to have a concrete idea of the
consequences of his act nor is it necessary that he exhibit an "abominable
attitude. 56 It is likewise not necessary to show that the individual perpe-
trator was aware that his or her actions were inhumane. Whether a
particular act is considered to be inhumane is judged according to a rea-
sonable person standard. 7 Thus, even if an individual act does not
immediately result in severe harm to the victim, and even if the perpe-
trator did not intend to inflict such severe harm or realize that his or her
act was inhumane, the act may nevertheless qualify as a crime against
humanity if a reasonable person would have concluded that such harm
was likely to result from the act.
The second element requires that there be some link between the in-
dividual's actions and the massive or systemic practice that gives rise to a
crime against humanity. As stated recently by the ICTY, in order for an
individual to be found guilty of a crime against humanity, the perpetrator
"must know that there is an attack on the civilian population, [and] know
that his act fits in with the attack."59 Willful ignorance is no defense to
this knowledge requirement. 6°
The responsibility of leaders, organizers, instigators, and accom-
plices for crimes against humanity has been a consistent part of all
54. Vukovar Hospital Rule 61 Decision, 30, U.N. Doc. IT-95-13-R61 (1996). See also
Draft Code, supra note 29, at 94-95 (noting that both a series of inhumane acts and an act of
extraordinary magnitude qualify as crimes against humanity).
55. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 1656.
56. Id. at 657.
57. See, e.g., The Queen v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701, at 820 (Can.). The Supreme Court
of Canada held that it was sufficient to show that the conditions to which the defendant con-
signed the victims were inhumane even if the defendant did not know or think so at the time.
58. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 659.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 657 (quoting majority holding in The Queen v. Finta that "the mental ele-
ment required to be proven to constitute a crime against humanity is that the accused was aware
of or wilfully [sic] blind to facts or circumstances which would bring his or her acts within
crimes against humanity" (emphasis added)).
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definitions of crimes against humanity.6' Individual responsibility for
,crimes against humanity extends to accomplices, aiders, and abettors. As
stated by one of the Nuremberg-era courts with respect to the crimes of
the Holocaust:
[t]here is no excuse or justification for any man who took a con-
scious or consenting part in the measures which constituted these
abominable and atrocious crimes, and it is immaterial whether
they originated or executed them, or merely implemented them,
justified them to the world, or gave aid and comfort to their per-
62petrators.
3. No Nexus with Armed Conflict
While the Nuremberg Tribunal only prosecuted crimes against hu-
manity that had been committed within the context of an international
armed conflict, international law evolved to eliminate this nexus re-
quirement. Control Council Law No. 10 included within its jurisdiction
crimes against humanity committed outside the context of an armed con-
flict.63 In 1954, the ILC's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and
Security of Mankind deliberately rejected the nexus requirement.'
There was initially some disagreement over whether Control Council
Law No. 10 and the ILC definition accurately reflected international law
on this issue at the time, but by the late 1960s little doubt remained that
the overwhelming majority of states no longer insisted that acts be con-
nected to an armed conflict in order to qualify as crimes against humanity
under international law. The 1968 Convention on the Non-Applicability
of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity
explicitly states that crimes against humanity can be committed in either
wartime or peacetime.6 ' Five years later, the International Convention on
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid stated that
61. See IMT Charter, supra note 18, art. 6; ICTY Statute, supra note 22, art. 7; Draft
Code, supra note 29, pt. 2.
62. United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), supra note 47, at 472.
63. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
64. See Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, [1954] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 140, at 150 (comment to Article 2, para. 11), U.N. Doc A/2693.
65. See Statutory Limitations Convention, supra note 1, at art. I. While many western
states abstained or voted against this Convention, it is clear from the travaux preparatoires of
the Convention that these states withheld their support for reasons unrelated to the removal of
the nexus with armed conflict. See Question of the Punishment of War Criminals and of Per-
sons Who Have Committed Crimes Against Humanity: Report of the Third Committee, U.N.
Gen. Assembly, 23d Sess., Agenda Item 55, U.N. Doc. A/7342, In 19-20 (1968) (indicating
United States acceptance, on behalf of France, Mexico, and the Netherlands, of language de-
fining crimes against humanity as occurring in times of war or peace).
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apartheid is a crime against humanity whether committed in wartime or
peacetime.66
The most recent authoritative statements of the international law of
crimes against humanity confirm that a nexus to armed conflict is not
required. The Statute of the ICTR and decisions by both the Trial and
Appeals Chambers of the ICTY support the conclusion that a nexus is no
longer required, as we will discuss below. The ICTR statute omits any
mention of a nexus to armed conflict. 67 In contrast, the statute for the
ICTY does include a nexus with armed conflict in its definition of crimes
against humanity.68 In one of its first decisions, however, the Appeals
Chamber of the ICTY suggested that the statute's definition of crimes
against humanity did not reflect the definition of the crime under cus-
tomary international law. The Appeals Chamber noted:
It is by now a settled rule of customary international law that
crimes against humanity do not require a connection to interna-
tional armed conflict. Indeed, .. . customary international law
may not require a connection between crimes against humanity
and any conflict at all. Thus, by requiring that crimes against
humanity be committed in either internal or international armed
conflict, the Security Council [in promulgating the statute] may
have defined the crime in Article 5 more narrowly than neces-
sary under customary international law.69
In a subsequent opinion, the Trial Chamber of the ICTY reaffirmed
this view. The Chamber noted that the inclusion of the requirement of an
armed conflict in the statute deviates from the doctrine as it has devel-
oped since the Nuremberg Charter, beginning with Control Council Law
No. 10, which no longer links the concept of crimes against humanity
with armed conflict.7" In support of its position that no nexus with armed
conflict is required, the Trial Chamber opinion cites the Secretary-
General's statement that crimes against humanity "are aimed at any ci-
66. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, opened for signature Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244 (entered into force July 18,
1976) [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
67. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
69. Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: Decision of Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on
Jurisdiction 73, para. 141, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-AR72 (1995). See also Federation Nationale des
Deportes et Internes Resistants et Patriotes and Others v. Barbie, 78 I.L.R. 125, 127 (1988)
(Cass. Crim.) (stating that in contrast to crimes against humanity, war crimes are directly con-
nected with the existence of a situation of hostilities declared between the respective States to
which the perpetrators and the victims of the acts in question belong) (emphasis added).
70. See Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, supra note 22, 627
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vilian population and are prohibited regardless of whether they are com-
mitted in an armed conflict, international or internal in character.",
7
'
Other authoritative bodies and experts have also concluded that
crimes against humanity can take place in both peacetime and wartime.
Since 1954, the ILC has consistently defined crimes against humanity
without requiring a link to an armed conflict. Finally, the majority of
international jurists who have studied this issue also agree that the defi-
nition of crimes against humanity does not include a nexus to armed
conflict."
We agree with the consensus that international law does not require
that an act be committed in the context of an armed conflict to constitute
a crime against humanity. Certainly by 1968, when the Convention on
the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limits to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity was ratified, the nexus to armed conflict was no
longer required. The question of whether or not an armed conflict existed
in South Africa during apartheid is thus irrelevant to a determination of
whether apartheid was a crime against humanity under international law
after 1968.
III. APARTHEID AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
Apartheid, as a form of systematic racial discrimination, violates in-
ternational law. The prohibition against racial discrimination is found in
71. ICTY Statute, supra note 22, 47.
72. See, e.g., Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Seventh
Report by Doudou Thiam, Special Rapporteur, [1989] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 81, 86, 38
U.N. Doc. AICN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.I (the concept of crimes against humanity now is
"separate from... war crimes... not only the 1954 draft code but even conventions which
have entered into force (on genocide and apartheid) no longer link that concept to a state of
war").
73. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, supra note 34, at 191 (nexus no longer required); Theodor
Meron, The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law,
90 AM. J. INT'L L. 238, 242 (1996) (arguing that the ICTY decisions and the ICTR Statute
strongly support the view that crimes against humanity can occur during peacetime); Payam
Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 501, 503 (1996) (describing absence of nexus between crimes
against humanity and armed conflicts in Tadic decision and ICTR Statute); Theodor Meron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554, 557 (1995) (crimes
against humanity can occur during peacetime); but see LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL RESPON-
SIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIoUs HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONs 44-50 (1992)
(insisting on Nuremberg Charter's requirement of nexus); Diane Orentlicher, Settling Accounts:
The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537, 2590
n.33 (1991) (arguing that international precedent has been inconclusive in determining whether
nexus needed).
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all the major international human rights treaties" and is universally rec-
ognized as a rule of customary international law.75 In addition, freedom
from discrimination is regularly included as one of the rights from which
derogation is not permitted in time of war or other national emergency.76
Systematic racial discrimination is a violation of a jus cogens norm
of international law.77 Jus cogens are peremptory norms of international
law from which no state may derogate by agreement or otherwise. Jus
cogens binds all states, and no state may "opt out" of a jus cogens norm.
Although few norms of international law rise to such peremptory status,78
the prohibition against systematic racial discrimination is one of them.
The fact that apartheid, as systematic racial discrimination, is recognized
as a violation of a jus cogens norm is further evidence that most states
• • • 79
recognize apartheid as an international crime.
As we have argued above, general human rights treaties and custom-
ary international law provide strong support for demonstrating that
apartheid is a violation of international law and an international crime. In
addition, the overwhelming majority of states have indicated their con-
74. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 2(2), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 4 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (135 parties as of Jan. 1,
1997) [hereinafter ICESCR]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16,
1966, art. 2(1), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 172 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) (136 parties as of Jan.
1, 1997) [hereinafter ICCPR]; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, art. 2(1),
28 I.L.M. 1448, 1450 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (190 parties as of Mar. 1, 1997); Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Jan. 7, 1966,
passim, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (148 parties as of Jan. 1, 1997);
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 26, 1981, art. 2, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev. 5 (1981), 21 I.L.M. 59 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) (fifty-one par-
ties as of Jan. 1, 1997); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 1(l), 1144
U.N.T.S. 123, 144 (entered into force July 18, 1978) (twenty-five parties as of Jan. 1, 1997)
[hereinafter ACHR]; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, 232 (entered into force Sept. 3,
1953), amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, and 8 (entered into force on Sept. 21, 1970, Dec. 20,
1971 and Jan. 1, 1990, respectively) (thirty-four parties as of Jan. 1, 1997) [hereinafter ECHR].
75. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 702(0(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (systematic racial discrimination violates a
rule of customary international law).
76. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 74, art. 4(1); ACHR, supra note 70, art. 27(1).
77. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 75, § 702, cmt. n (indicating that systematic racial
discrimination is a violation of jus cogens).
78. See, e.g., id. (listing genocide; slavery or slave trade, murder or causing the disappear-
ance of an individual; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment;
prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial discrimination as violations of jus cogens).
79. For those human rights norms that have risen to the level of jus cogens, their violation
is recognized as an international crime. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (criminalizing genocide);
Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 212 U.N.T.S. 17 (criminalizing slavery) (amended by the
Protocol opened for signature or acceptance at the Headquarters for the United Nations, New
York, Dec. 7, 1953); Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, 23 I.L.M. 1027 (criminalizing torture).
Winter 19991
Michigan Journal of International Law
viction that apartheid is a crime against humanity in connection with two
major international treaties: the Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity of
1968 and the International Convention on the Suppression and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Apartheid of 1976. Both conventions support the
conclusion that apartheid is a crime against humanity, although the use of
these conventions to conclude that apartheid is a crime against humanity
has not been without controversy. The controversies surrounding these
two conventions-including the fact that some states did not sign or rat-
ify them-lead us to discuss in some detail the circumstances
surrounding the treatment of apartheid and crimes against humanity in
each convention.
A. Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity
As early as the late 1960s, international sentiment began to develop
among states that apartheid is a crime against humanity. The Convention
on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and
Crimes Against Humanity of 1968 ("Statutory Limitations Convention")
singled out apartheid in its definition of crimes against humanity:
"[C]rimes against humanity whether committed in time of war or in time
of peace as they are defined in the Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, N[ue]mberg ... ,eviction by armed attack or occupation and
inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid. .. ."0 Although it is
true that this convention was not universally accepted,8' forty of the forty-
three countries that abstained or voted against the Statutory Limitations
Convention did so on technical grounds having nothing to do with
whether apartheid was a crime against humanity.82 Most of the states
80. Statutory Limitations Convention, supra note 1.
81. The General Assembly resolution endorsing the Convention was passed by a vote of
58-7-36. See U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 1727th plen. mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/PV.1727 (1968).
Those voting in favor included Israel, as well as the largest democracy in the world, India. The
following states voted against endorsing the convention: Australia, El Salvador, Honduras,
Portugal, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. France abstained. Most of
the industrialized countries and many countries in Latin America abstained. (The following
states abstained: Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, Finland, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Iceland, Ireland,
Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Laos, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Peru, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.)
82. It is always dangerous to ascribe too much meaning to an individual state's vote.
While it is probably fair to assert that a favorable vote indicates support for all of the provisions
of the document in question, the meaning of a vote abstaining from or opposing is less clear.
Certainly it does not necessarily indicate a disagreement with all of the provisions of the text in
question, nor whether or not a particular norm is a part of customary international law, nor for
that matter whether the state in question disagrees with the proposition that some of the docu-
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voting against the convention or abstaining did so because of the con-
vention's attempt to apply its terms retroactively, thus violating a basic
principle of criminal law: nullum crimen sine lege ("no crime without
law," which is interpreted as a general prohibition against retroactive
criminal law). Others opposed the convention because of the definition of
crimes against humanity. Those states that criticized the definition of
crimes against humanity did so not out of a belief that apartheid could
not be considered a crime against humanity but because the definition
was not general enough. These states were concerned that by singling out
one ideology-apartheid-the convention implied that similar acts un-
dertaken in the name of other ideologies might not be considered as
83
severe.
Even states that ultimately voted for the resolution endorsing the
convention criticized the inclusion of a specific reference to apartheid.
Chile, for example, argued for removing the reference to "inhuman acts
resulting from the policy of apartheid '84 because it added nothing legally
to the definition and merely expressed a condemnation of a particular
ideology. The Chilean representative was quick to point out that remov-
ing the reference would in no way mean that inhuman acts arising out of
apartheid would not qualify as a crime against humanity; if these acts met
ment's provisions already constitute customary international law. The United States, for exam-
ple, did not ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
until 1988. It is obviously absurd to conclude from that fact that genocide was not a crime un-
der international law prior to the United States' ratification, or even to conclude that the official
U.S. position prior to 1988 was that genocide was not a crime under international law. State-
ments by representatives explaining their country's vote provide some explanation, but even
there we cannot be sure whether the silence about other provisions indicates support, indiffer-
ence, or opposition. We therefore cautiously rely on such official statements to give meaning to
individual votes.
83. France, a country that abstained from voting on the Convention, made the following
statement regarding the proposed definition of crimes against humanity: "Furthermore, the
words 'including inhuman acts resulting from the policy of apartheid' were superfluous, since
the convention declared that all crimes against humanity lacked the protection of statutory
limitation, regardless of the political, racial or social doctrine which gave rise to them." U.N.
GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1565th mtg. at 2, T 13, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1565 (1968). The
French representative also "felt that it was most essential, when defining crimes against hu-
manity, to avoid giving a list of examples which could not be regarded as exhaustive." Id. at
14. The representative from Saudi Arabia stated that "[i]t was pointless, in his view, to men-
tion crimes resulting from the policy of apartheid, because apartheid was doomed to disappear
sooner or later, and the convention should be universal in scope." U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d
Sess., 1566th mtg. at. 3, 125, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1566 (1968). Finally, the representative
from China reiterated the Chinese government's firm opposition to apartheid, and noted that it
had voted for all U.N. resolutions condemning it. The Chinese representative went on to argue,
however, that apartheid should not be specifically mentioned in the definition "since such a
convention should be generally applicable and should produce lasting results." U.N. GAOR 3d
Comm., 23d Sess., 1568th mtg at 1, 5, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1568 (1968).
84. See Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 23d Sess., 7174th plen. mtg. at 9,
U.N. Doc. A/7174 (1968).
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the general definition they would so qualify.85 Saudi Arabia argued that
the definition should not just mention one form of crime against human-
ity and not others.8 6
Of all the states that abstained or voted against the convention, only
the United States, the United Kingdom, and Austria indicated that they
might not agree that the policy of apartheid as it was understood at the
time constituted a crime against humanity. The concerns that led to the
opposition of these three states might be explained by their agreement
with other states that the treaty should be as universal as possible and not
single out a particular ideology. The United Kingdom, for example,
made the following statement regarding apartheid and the definition of
crimes against humanity:
Furthermore, although her delegation fully understood and
shared the anxiety that the policy of apartheid aroused in the
Committee, it considered it inappropriate specifically to mention
inhuman acts resulting from that policy in a text intended to be
universal. The United Kingdom amendment proposed a defini-
tion which could readily be applied by all States, which allowed
for the progressive development of international law, and did not
exclude the possibility of including other crimes among crimes
against humanity which might arise. 7
Even if the travaux preparatoires indicate that the United States, 8
the United Kingdom, and Austria did not agree in 1968 that apartheid
was a crime against humanity (and it is unclear based on their recorded
statements whether they did), subsequent resolutions of the U.N. Security
Council show a change in their position.90
B. International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
In the mid-1970s, the international community adopted a convention
specifically designed to define and criminalize apartheid as a crime
85. Id.
86. See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 22d Sess., 1515th mtg. at 267, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.1515
(1967).
87. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 23d Sess., 1566th mtg. at 1, [ 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1566
(1968) (emphasis added). The U.K. proposal for a definition consisted of a general reference to
crimes against humanity as defined under international law.
88. For a statement of the U.S. position, see U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1549, 11 (noting that
the Convention should only refer to crimes against humanity as defined under international
law).
89. For a statement of the Austrian position, see U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1573, 24 (noting
that the Convention applied to "new crimes" is not covered by Austrian legislation).
90. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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against humanity. Article I(1) of the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid ("Apartheid
Convention"), adopted in 1973, declares that:
apartheid is a crime against humanity and that inhuman acts re-
suiting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimina-
tion ... are crimes violating the principles of international law,
in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations, and constituting a serious threat to international
peace and security."
The Apartheid Convention was not unanimously adopted. However,
a careful review of the debates leading up to the adoption of the Apart-
heid Convention, including the statements of country representatives
explaining their votes, shows that support was withheld on mostly tech-
nical grounds. The classification of apartheid as a crime against humanity
was generally not at issue.
Those states that refused to endorse the Apartheid Convention, either
by voting against or abstaining during the General Assembly vote, cited
two major reasons.92 One concern was the convention's unprecedented
attempt to expand international criminal jurisdiction and enforcement.
The Apartheid Convention created criminal liability for individuals who
(regardless of their motive or place of residence), abetted, encouraged, or
cooperated in the crime of apartheid.93 Thus an individual or organization
that had no intention of supporting apartheid might be criminally liable
for acts that had the unintended effect of encouraging apartheid. In addi-
tion, any state would have mandatory jurisdiction to prosecute such an
individual or organization.
The Apartheid Convention's broad grant of jurisdiction to prosecute
an individual guilty of the crime of apartheid (regardless of the national-
ity of the perpetrator or the situs of the crime), goes beyond the
enforcement regime of the Genocide Convention, which limits enforce-
ment to tribunals of the state in which the genocide occurred, or to an
91. See supra note 66, at 245.
92. On the art of interpreting a state's position based on its votes of abstention or opposi-
tion, see generally, RESTATEMENT, supra note 77.
93. See Apartheid Convention, supra note 91, art. 3, at 246. By contrast, Article 2, para-
graph 3(d) of the Draft Code sanctions an individual who "knowingly aids, abets or otherwise
assists, directly and substantially, in the commission of [certain crimes against the peace and
security of mankind]." Report of the ILC on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May-26
July 1996, 18 HUM. RTS. L.J. 96, 103 and 105, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (emphasis added).
94. See Apartheid Convention, supra note 91, arts. IV(b) and V, at 246.
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international tribunal.95 The United States representative illustrated the
concern of many states:
We do not, for example, accept that an American citizen vaca-
tioning in a foreign country could be extradited to another
foreign country and tried in that third foreign country for some-
thing that he has said on the territory of the United States, a
result which would flow quite clearly from the provisions of this
convention."
In short, the concern was that the Apartheid Convention was drafted
so broadly that it both criminalized acts that were not criminal under
most national legal systems, and obligated all states to prosecute indi-
viduals regardless of nationality for acts that had occurred outside the
territory of the prosecuting state.
The other reason cited by a number of states in refusing to support
the Apartheid Convention concerned the expansion of the powers of the
Human Rights Commission, which was designated as the monitoring and
enforcement body under the convention. As articulated by the United
States representative, the question was whether "States parties to a con-
vention can confer additional powers upon an organ created under the
United Nations Charter.
'97
It was these concerns, more than any qualms about confirming the
criminal nature of apartheid, that were at the heart of many states' reluc-
tance to support the convention. In fact, the United States representative
went so far as to state that the Apartheid Convention was unnecessary in
part because "the most serious offenses defined in the draft convention
were already punishable under the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide."98 Thus, with the exception of
95. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 79, art. VI.
96. U.N. GAOR (Provisional), 28th Sess., 2185th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2185, T 25
(1973). The Apartheid Convention itself does not mention speech as an act that can result in
criminal liability. The United States was presumably concerned with the interpretation of the
phrase "abet" or "encourage," which could give rise to criminal liability. The concern was
certainly heightened by the fact that these phrases could be interpreted and applied to United
States citizens by non-United States courts, thus leaving open the possibility of extraterritorial
infringement on the United States constitutional right to freedom of speech as interpreted by
United States courts. See id.
97. U.N. GAOR (Provisional), 28th Sess., 2185th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/PV.2185, 26
(1973). In addition to this structural or constitutional issue, the U.S. representative also noted
that this use of the Human Rights Commission also posed a practical problem: placing the
Human Rights Commission "in the untenable position of having to discharge its functions un-
der a convention which the majority of its members have not signed and do not support." Id. at
16.
98. U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2003d mtg. 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.2003
(1973). See also U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.2008, at $ 12 (statement of Spanish representative that
[Vol. 20:267
Apartheid as a Crime Against Humanity
certain isolated statements made by the United States99 and the United
Kingdom,' ° the classification of apartheid as a crime against humanity
was never at issue in the debates surrounding the Apartheid Convention.
C. Post-Apartheid Convention Developments: The International
Consensus Becomes Unanimous
Finally, as more information came to light concerning the policy and
practice of apartheid and its effects, those states that had earlier appeared
reluctant to publicly describe apartheid as a crime against humanity re-
versed their positions. By 1976 it was clear that much of the international
community agreed that apartheid was a crime against humanity. It was in
that year that the Security Council, in direct response to the South Afri-
can government's murder of school children in Soweto unanimously
stated that "apartheid is a crime against the conscience and dignity of
mankind."'' While the resolution did not use the phrase "crimes against
humanity," its language, echoes previous declarations of apartheid as a
crime against humanity. Subsequent Security Council resolutions re-
ferred favorably to that 1976 resolution.' 2 Finally, in 1984, the U.N.
Security Council issued a Resolution explicitly referring to apartheid as a
crime against humanity. All of the members of the Security Council, in-
similar acts are already punished under the Genocide Convention). The U.S. representative in
the Third Committee also stated that the United States did not accept that apartheid was already
generally regarded as a crime against humanity, noting that crime against humanity should be
strictly construed in accordance with the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 1945.
See U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 28th Sess., 2003d mtg. para. 12, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.2003
(1973). Such a view does not mean that the United States felt that some aspects of apartheid did
not constitute a crime against humanity-in fact the earlier reference to the Genocide Conven-
tion suggests that the United States was not reluctant to entertain the notion that some aspects
of apartheid might constitute a particular form of crime against humanity. In fact, the U.S.
representative to the General Assembly, in explaining the U.S. vote against the resolution en-
dorsing the Convention, was very careful in stating that the U.S. vote was based on the
unprecedented expansion of criminal jurisdiction and liability that were embodied in the Con-
vention. See U.N. GAOR (Provisional), 28th Sess., 2185th mtg. at 16, paras. 21-29, U.N. Doc.
A/PV.2185 (1973).
99. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 2003, 12 (U.S. does not accept view that apartheid is a
crime against humanity while at the same time noting that many of the most serious offenses in
the Apartheid Convention are prohibited by the Genocide Convention).
100. See U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. 2008, 20 (U.K. representative noting that while apart-
heid was abhorrent it did not meet the legal definition of a crime against humanity).
101. S.C. Res. 392, U.N. Doc. S/RES/392 (1976) and S.C. Res. 473, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/473 (1980). The following resolutions refer to either or both of these resolutions, and
were also passed unanimously: S.C. Res. 417, U.N. Doc. S/RES/417 (1977); S.C. Res. 418,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/418 (1977); S.C. Res. 421, U.N. Doc. S/RES/421 (1977); S.C. Res. 591,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/591 (1986).
102. See, e.g., U.N. Security Council Resolutions 417 (1977), 418 (1977), 421 (1977),
473 (1980), and 591 (1986) supra note 101.
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cluding the United Kingdom, voted for the resolution, except for the
United States, which abstained.' 3
IV. GENOCIDE
The crime of genocide falls under the general category of crimes
against humanity but is also a distinct type of human rights violation.
Unlike the general category of crimes against humanity the crime of
genocide was codified early, in the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide Convention"), which
has been accepted and ratified by over one hundred states.'0T The crime of
genocide is also part of customary international law.' 5 As defined in the
Genocide Convention, certain acts qualify as genocide regardless of
whether or not they were committed in the context of an armed conflict.
The Convention defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures to prevent births within the group;
103. See U.N. Security Resolution 556 (1984). The statement of the U.S. Representative
to the United Nations explaining her country's vote does not shed any light on the reasoning for
the abstention.
104. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra
note 74, art. VI. As of January 1, 1997, 122 states have ratified the Genocide Convention. See
Jean-Bernard Marie, International Instruments Relating to Human Rights, 18 HuM. RTS. L.J.
79, 86 (1997).
105. The International Court of Justice, for example, has stated that the prohibition
against genocide is a jus cogens norm. See Reservation to the Convention on Genocide, 1951
I.C.J. Rep. 15, 23. The first case to be brought under Article IX of the Genocide Convention is
still pending before the International Court of Justice. See generally Case Concerning the Ap-
plication of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) 1993 I.C.J. Rep. 325.
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(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
106
group.
Thus, the crime of genocide includes two major elements that distin-
guish it from other crimes against humanity: (1) a specific intent to cause
that destruction, and (2) actions that are directed towards the physical
destruction of a group. It is the intent requirement that most distinguishes
genocide from other forms of crimes against humanity. Thus murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts that
qualify as a crime against humanity remain outside the scope of the
Genocide Convention unless committed with the specific intent to elimi-
nate, in whole or in part, a protected group.
The drafters of the Genocide Convention took great care to limit the
scope of the definition of genocide. The convention arose in response to
the Nazi atrocities of World War II and their prosecution, '°7 and was ex-
plicitly designed to capture the uniqueness of those particular crimes.
The drafters were concerned in part that an overly expansive definition
would dilute the effectiveness of the convention and might lead to gov-
ernments abstaining from joining the convention.10 8 In the Study on the
Draft Convention, the drafters comment:
Genocide is the deliberate destruction of a human group. This
literal definition must be rigidly adhered to; otherwise there is a
danger of the idea of genocide being expanded indefinitely to in-
clude the law of war, the right of people's to self-definition, the
protection of minorities, the respect of human rights, etc."°
The crime of genocide is thus a carefully defined and specialized
subcategory of the broader international crime of crimes against human-
ity.
A. Specific Intent
The primary element that distinguishes genocide from crimes against
humanity is the requirement of specific intent. Under the Genocide Con-
106. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, supra note
74, art. II.
107. The first international document to use the term genocide was the indictment against
major German war criminals before the Nuremberg Tribunal. See i IMT Trials supra note 38,
at 43-44. The indictment accused the Nazis of conducting deliberate and systematic genocide,
viz. the extermination of racial and national groups, against the civilian populations of certain
occupied territories in order to destroy particular races and classes of people and national, racial
or religious groups. Although the Nuremberg Tribunal did not directly use the word genocide
in its judgment, it referred to the concept of genocide by detailing how the mass murders were
part of a plan to annihilate various groups.
108. See Study on the Draft Convention, 4 U.N. ESCOR, U.N. Doc. E/447 (1947).
109. Id.
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vention, the crime of genocide is not committed simply by the physical
destruction of a group, in whole or in part, of a racial, national, ethnic or
religious group; there must be a specific intent to destroy such a group in
whole or in part. As the Brazilian representative remarked during the de-
bates of the Sixth Committee:
[G]enocide was characterized by the factor of particular intent to
destroy a group. In the absence of that factor, whatever the de-
gree of atrocity of an act and however similar it might be to the
acts described in the convention, that act could still not be called
genocide."°
Proof of the intent to commit genocide could be shown, like in the
Nazi criminal trials, with specific written or oral orders. Intent can also
be shown through actions. Certain policies or acts in and of themselves
may foreseeably result in such a large number of deaths that one can in-
fer the requisite intent.
B. Physical Destruction Requirement
The specific intent requirement of the Genocide Convention can only
be fulfilled by an intent to physically destroy the group, in whole or in
part. The convention's references to killing and serious bodily or mental
harm highlight that it is the actual or attempted physical destruction of a
group that is the focus of the Genocide Convention rather than a cultural
or social destruction."' This focus was apparent in early United Nations
resolutions that compared genocide to homicide:
Genocide is a denial of the right of existence of entire human
groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to life of individual
human beings: such denial of the right of existence shocks the
conscience of mankind, results in great losses to humanity in the
form of cultural and other contributions represented by these
human groups, and is contrary to moral law and to the spirit and
aims of the United Nations." 2
In earlier drafts of the convention, there were proposals to include
cultural genocide in the definition of genocide. "' After much debate,
110. U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Part 1, 6th Comm., 69th mtg., at 87 (1985).
111. See SUNGA, supra note 68, at 68.
112. LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE 23 (1981).
113. In a draft prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee, genocide incorporated a cultural as-
pect which was removed by the Sixth Committee. See U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. Part 1, 6th
Comm., 83d mtg. at 306.
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however, the concept of cultural genocide was explicitly excluded.'"4 Ad-
ditional proposals to include political and social groups were similarly
excluded."' Therefore, under a strict application of the Genocide Con-
vention, acts directed only towards the destruction of the culture or
socio-economic status of a group, and not towards its physical destruc-
tion, are not sufficient to constitute genocide.
C. Apartheid and the Definition of Genocide
Although apartheid is one of the worst examples of human rights
abuses that humans have endured, it may not fit within the specific, nar-
row definition of genocide. To equate apartheid with genocide, the TRC
would have to show that those who formulated and implemented apart-
heid did so with the specific intent to eliminate in whole or in part a
protected group. In South Africa, the racially and ethnically defined
groups of blacks and coloreds would qualify as protected groups. Al-
though specific acts undertaken by individuals or groups who had the
relevant intent to destroy a group in whole or in part might qualify as
genocidal acts,"6 the policy of apartheid as a whole does not appear to
have been primarily aimed at extermination, but rather at domination and
exploitation. If the requisite intent is in fact found, then of course apart-
heid would qualify as genocide. While apartheid may not qualify as
genocide, this does not mean that apartheid is a less severe crime under
international law.
In this Convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent
to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or religious group on
grounds of the national or racial origin or religious belief of its members such as:
1. Prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in
schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group;
2. Destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical
monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group.
Id.
114. See the arguments, pro and con, in LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE 3, n. 35 (1981).
115. See generally Beth Van Schaack, Note, The Crine of Political Genocide: Repairing
the Genocide Convention's Blind Spot, 106 YALE L.J. 2259 (1997).
116. One example of such intent might be found in the recent revelations concerning the
apartheid regime's chemical and biological warfare programs, in particular the suggestion that
efforts were made to develop chemical or biological weapons that would only apply to black
people.
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CONCLUSION
This submission has set forth the elements that must be met in order
to establish that apartheid is a crime against humanity. As experts in in-
ternational law, we agree with the international consensus that apartheid,
as a widespread and systematic policy of racial discrimination imple-
mented with widespread and systematic inhumane acts, constitutes a
crime against humanity. The wealth of information collected by the TRC
confirms that apartheid consisted of widespread and systematic persecu-
tions on racial grounds, as well as other inhumane acts, and demonstrates
that apartheid clearly meets the definition of a crime against humanity.
As international jurists interested in human rights, we have followed
the recent history of South Africa and its tremendous efforts to overcome
a system of hatred, division, and oppression in favor of a society that
recognizes, protects, and promotes the fundamental rights of all of its
citizens. We hope that with this submission we have made a small but
constructive contribution to these efforts to secure human rights and en-
hance the rule of law.
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